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This article is about the war that began in 2003. For other uses, see Iraq war (disambiguation).
The Iraq War, also known as the Second Gulf War or the Occupation of Iraq,33 is an ongoing military campaign which began on March 20, 2003 with the invasion of Iraq by a multinational force led by and composed largely of United States and United Kingdom troops. The force was supported by smaller contingents from Australia, Denmark, Poland and other nations. All of the Arab states and a number of members of the NATO alliance did not publicly support the invasion, while some Eastern European states did.34 Prior to the war, Iraq's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was claimed to pose a serious and imminent threat to the security of the United States and its coalition allies.3536 This assessment was supported by the U.K. intelligence services, but not by other countries such as France, Russia and Germany.373839 United Nations weapons inspectors found no evidence of WMD, giving support to earlier criticism of poor intelligence on Iraqi WMDs.40 After the invasion, the U.S.-led Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had ended its WMD programs in 1991 and had no active programs at the time of the invasion, but that they intended to resume production if the Iraq sanctions were lifted.41 Although some degraded remnants of misplaced or abandoned chemical weapons from before 1991 were found, they were not the weapons for which the coalition invaded.42 The failure to find WMD in Iraq caused controversy, particularly in the United States.43 Some U.S. officials also accused Saddam Hussein of harboring and supporting Al-Qaeda,44 but no evidence of any collaborative relationship was ever found.4546 Bush reportedly told Palestinian officials either that God inspired him to end the tyranny in Iraq, or to hit Saddam.47 Other reasons for the invasion stated by U.S. officials included Iraq's alleged financial support for the families of Palestinian suicide bombers,48 Iraqi government human rights abuses,49 spreading democracy,50 and Iraq's oil reserves,51525354 although that was denied by other officials.555657 The invasion led to the quick defeat of the Iraqi military, and the eventual capture and execution of Saddam Hussein. The U.S.-led coalition occupied Iraq and attempted to establish a new democratic government; however, violence against coalition forces and among various sectarian groups soon led to asymmetric warfare with the Iraqi insurgency, strife between many Sunni and Shia Iraqi groups, and al-Qaeda operations in Iraq.5859 Estimates of the number of Iraqis killed through 2007 range from 150,00029 to more than 1,000,000.26 UNHCR estimates the war created 4.7 million Iraqi refugees through April 2008 (about 16% of the population of Iraq.)60 The U.S. Department of Defense claimed in 2008 that "the security, political and economic trends in Iraq continue to be positive, however, they remain fragile, reversible and uneven."61 Iraq was fifth on the 2008 Failed States Index,62 and the Red Cross stated in 2008 that Iraq's humanitarian situation "remains among the most critical in the world".63 Member nations of the Coalition began to withdraw their forces as public opinion favoring troop withdrawals increased in their countries and Iraq and as Iraqi forces began to take responsibility for security.6465 On November 27, 2008, the Iraqi Parliament ratified a Status of Forces Agreement with the United States, establishing that Coalition combat forces will withdraw from Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009, and will be completely out of Iraq by December 31, 2011 pending any negotiations. The pact forbids holding prisoners without criminal charges, and limits searches of homes and buildings.66 The pact subjects Coalition forces and contractors to Iraqi law if they commit major and premeditated crimes while off-duty and off-base.6766 Some groups of Iraqis protested the passing of the accord,6869 and a representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali Husseini al-Sistani expressed concern the ratified version of the pact would grant the occupiers immunity from prosecution in Iraqi courts among other things.70 A referendum will be held in mid-2009, which may terminate the agreement and require Coalition forces to completely leave by the middle of 2010.71 Parliament also passed another U.S.-Iraqi bilateral pact called the Strategic Framework Agreement,72 aimed at ensuring constitutional ethnic, religious, and gender rights. The pact also aims to ensure cooperation in the areas of threat deterrence, education, energy development, environmental hygiene, health care, information technology, communications and law enforcement.73 1991–2000: U.N. inspectors, no-fly zones, and Iraqi opposition groups
Following the 1991 Gulf War, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 mandated that Iraqi chemical, biological, nuclear, and long range missile programs be halted and all such weapons destroyed under United Nations Special Commission control. U.N. weapons inspectors inside Iraq were able to verify the destruction of a large amount of WMD-material, but substantial issues remained unresolved in 1998 when the inspectors left Iraq due to then current UNSCOM head Richard Butler's belief that U.S. and UK military action was imminent. Shortly after the inspectors withdrew, the U.S. and UK launched a four-day bombing campaign. Also, during this period the US congress and President Clinton issued a resolution calling for regime change in Iraq. In addition to the inspection regimen, the U.S. and UK (along with France until 1998) engaged in a low-level conflict with Iraq by enforcing northern and southern Iraqi no-fly zones. These zones were created following the Persian Gulf War to protect Iraqi Kurdistan in the north and the southern Shia areas, and were seen by the Iraqi government as an infringement of Iraq's sovereignty. The no-fly zones prohibited unauthorized fixed-wing aircraft but allowed Iraqi helicopters or limited Turkish bombing runs7475. Iraqi air-defense installations and American and British air patrols regularly exchanged fire during this five year period. Approximately one year before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. initiated Operation Southern Focus as a change to its response strategy, by increasing the overall number of missions and selecting targets throughout the no-fly zones in order to disrupt the military command structure in Iraq. The weight of bombs dropped on Iraq increased from none in March 2002 and 0.3 short tons (0.27 t) in April to between 8 short tons (7.3 t) to 14 short tons (13 t) per month in May-August. The total reached a pre-war peak of 54.6 short tons (49.5 t) in September 2002. Iraqi opposition groupsFollowing the Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush signed a presidential finding directing the Central Intelligence Agency to create conditions for Hussein's removal in May 1991. Coordinating anti-Saddam groups was an important element of this strategy and the Iraqi National Congress (INC), led by Ahmed Chalabi, was the main group tasked with this purpose. The name INC was reportedly coined by public relations expert John Rendon (of the Rendon Group agency) and the group received millions in covert funding in the 1990s, and then about $8 million a year in overt funding after the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998. Another opposition group was the Iraqi National Accord which continues to have influence in the current Iraqi government through its leader Ayad Allawi. Presidential involvementIn late April 1993, the United States learned that Saddam Hussein had attempted to have former President George H. W. Bush assassinated during a visit to Kuwait on April 16.76 On June 16, as per order of then-President Clinton, a cruise missile was shot at the Iraq Intelligence Service building in downtown Baghdad, by way of retaliation. Clinton briefed President-elect George W. Bush in December 2000, expressing his regret that the world's two most dangerous individuals, including Saddam, were still at large. He warned that Saddam will "cause you a world of problems."77 2001–2003: Iraq disarmament crisis and pre-war intelligence
According to documents provided by former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, Bush instructed his aides to look for a way to overthrow the Iraqi regime ten days after taking office in January, 2001. A secret memo entitled, "Plan for post-Saddam Iraq," was discussed in January and February of 2001, and a Pentagon document, dated March 5, 2001, and entitled "Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield contracts," included a map of potential areas for exploration.78 U.N. weapons inspections resumeThe issue of Iraq's disarmament reached a crisis in 2002-2003, when President Bush demanded a complete end to alleged Iraqi production of weapons of mass destruction and full compliance with UN Resolutions requiring UN weapons inspectors unfettered access to suspected weapons production facilities. Previously, the UN had prohibited Iraq from developing or possessing such weapons after the Gulf War and required Iraq to permit inspections confirming compliance. During 2002, Bush repeatedly backed demands for unfettered inspection and disarmament with threats of military force. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1441 Iraq reluctantly agreed to new inspections in late 2002. The results of these inspections were mixed, with the inspectors discovering no WMD programs but concluding that Iraqi declarations failed to prove that all such weapons had been properly destroyed. Iraq's WMD controversyIn the initial stages of the war on terror, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), under George Tenet, was rising to prominence as the lead agency in the Afghanistan war. But when Tenet insisted in his personal meetings with President Bush that there was no connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq, Vice-President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld initiated a secret program to re-examine the evidence and marginalize the CIA and Tenet. A major part of this program was a Pentagon unit known as the Office of Special Plans (OSP), which was created by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and headed by Douglas Feith. It was created to supply senior Bush administration officials with raw intelligence pertaining to Iraq, unvetted by intelligence analysts, and circumventing traditional intelligence gathering operations by the CIA. The questionable intelligence acquired by the OSP was "stovepiped" to Cheney and presented to the public. In some cases, Cheney’s office would leak the intelligence to news correspondents, who would in turn cover it in such outlets such as The New York Times. Cheney would subsequently appear on the Sunday political television talk shows to discuss the intelligence, referencing The New York Times as the source to give it credence.79
Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson
Prior to the Gulf War, in 1990, Iraq had stockpiled 550 short tons (500 t) of yellowcake uranium at the Tuwaitha nuclear complex about 20 kilometres (12 mi) south of Baghdad.80 In late February 2002, the CIA sent former Ambassador Joseph Wilson to investigate reports that Iraq was attempting to purchase additional yellowcake from Niger. Wilson returned and informed the CIA that reports of yellowcake sales to Iraq were "unequivocally wrong." The Bush administration, however, continued to allege Iraq's attempts to obtain additional yellowcake were a justification for military action - most prominently in the January, 2003 State of the Union address when President Bush said that Iraq had sought uranium, citing British intelligence sources.81 In response, Wilson wrote a critical New York Times op-ed piece in June 2003 stating that he had personally investigated claims of yellowcake purchases and believed them to be fraudulent. Wilson's report did not clarify the matter for analysts, but they found it interesting that the former Nigerien Prime Minister said an Iraqi delegation had visited Niger for what he believed was to discuss uranium sales.82 Shortly after Wilson's op-ed, the identity of Wilson's wife, undercover CIA analyst Valerie Plame, was revealed in a column by Robert Novak. Since it is a felony to reveal the identity of a CIA agent Novak's column launched an investigation by the Justice Department into the source of the leak. In March, 2007, Dick Cheney’s Chief of Staff I. Lewis 'Scooter' Libby was convicted of perjury in the Plame leak investigation. The source of the leak was found to be former deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage, who was never charged with the crime.83 In June 2008, Representative Henry Waxman called on the Justice Department to release unredacted transcripts of the FBI interviews in which Libby stated that it was "possible" that Vice President Cheney instructed him to release the information to the press.84 On May 1, 2005 the "Downing Street memo" was published in The Sunday Times. It contained an overview of a secret July 23, 2002 meeting among UK Labour government, defense, and intelligence figures who discussed the build-up to the Iraq war — including direct references to classified U.S. policy of the time. The memo stated, "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy."85 On September 18, 2002, George Tenet briefed Bush that Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction. Bush dismissed this top-secret intelligence from Saddam's inner circle which was approved by two senior CIA officers, but it turned out to be completely accurate. The information was never shared with Congress or even CIA agents examining whether Saddam had such weapons.86 The CIA had contacted Saddam Hussein's foreign minister, Naji Sabri, who was being paid by the French as an agent. Sabri informed them that Saddam had ambitions for a nuclear program but that it was not active, and that no biological weapons were being produced or stockpiled, although research was underway.87 In September 2002, the Bush administration, the CIA and the DIA said attempts by Iraq to acquire high-strength aluminum tubes, which were prohibited under the UN monitoring program, pointed to a clandestine effort to make enriched uranium for nuclear bombs.88 This analysis was opposed by the Department of Energy (DOE) and INR which was significant because of DOE's expertise in gas centrifuges and nuclear weapons programs. The DOE and INR argued that such tubes were poorly suited for centrifuges.89 An effort by the DOE to change Powell's comments before his UN appearance was rebuffed by the administration.9091 Indeed, Colin Powell, in his address to the U.N. Security Council just prior to the war, made reference to the aluminum tubes. But a report released by the Institute for Science and International Security in 2002 reported that it was highly unlikely that the tubes could be used to enrich uranium. Powell later admitted he had presented an inaccurate case to the United Nations on Iraqi weapons, and the intelligence he was relying on was, in some cases, "deliberately misleading."929394 Shortly after the United States presidential election, 2008, and the election of rivial democratic party nominee Barack Obama, president Bush admitted that "[my] biggest regret of all the presidency has to have been the intelligence failure in Iraq".95 Authorization for the use of force
Colin Powell holding a model vial of anthrax while giving a presentation to the United Nations Security Council
In October 2002, a few days before the U.S. Senate voted on the Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq, about 75 senators were told in closed session that Saddam Hussein had the means of attacking the eastern seaboard of the U.S. with biological or chemical weapons delivered by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs.)36 On February 5, 2003, Colin Powell presented further evidence in his Iraqi WMD program presentation to the UN Security Council that UAVs were ready to be launched against the U.S. At the time, there was a vigorous dispute within the US military and intelligence community as to whether CIA conclusions about Iraqi UAVs were accurate.96 The U.S. Air Force agency most familiar with UAVs denied that Iraq possessed any offensive UAV capability, saying the few they had were designed for surveillance and intended for reconnaissance.97 In fact, Iraq's UAV fleet was never deployed and consisted of a handful of outdated 24.5-foot (7.5 m) wingspan drones with no room for more than a camera and video recorder, and no offensive capability.98 Despite this controversy, the Senate voted to approve the Joint Resolution on October 11, 2002 providing the Bush Administration with the legal basis for the U.S. invasion. With the support of large bipartisan majorities, the US Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. The resolution asserts the authorization by the Constitution of the United States and the United States Congress for the President to fight anti-United States terrorism. Citing the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, the resolution reiterated that it should be the policy of the United States to remove the Saddam Hussein regime and promote a democratic replacement. The resolution "supported" and "encouraged" diplomatic efforts by President George W. Bush to "strictly enforce through the U.N. Security Council all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq" and "obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion, and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq." The resolution authorized President Bush to use the Armed Forces of the United States "as he determines to be necessary and appropriate" in order to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq." Chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix remarked in January 2003 that "Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance – not even today – of the disarmament, which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace."99 Among other things he noted that 1,000 short tons (910 t) of chemical agent were unaccounted for, information on Iraq's VX nerve agent program was missing, and that "no convincing evidence" was presented for the destruction of 8,500 litres (1,900 imp gal/2,200 US gal) of anthrax that had been declared.99 Secretary of State Collin Powell's presentation to the U.N. on February 3, 2003 was designed to influence U.N. members that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. France even believed that Saddam had stockpiles of anthrax and botulism toxin, and the ability to produce VX.100 But in March, Blix said no evidence of WMDs had been found, and progress had been made in inspections.40 In early 2003, the U.S., UK, and Spain proposed the so-called "eighteenth resolution" to give Iraq a deadline for compliance with previous resolutions enforced by the threat of military action. This proposed resolution was subsequently withdrawn due to lack of support on the UN Security Council. In particular, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members France, Germany and Canada together with Russia, were opposed to military intervention in Iraq due to the high level of risk to the international community's security and defended disarmament through diplomacy.101102 Opposition to invasion
On January 20, 2003, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin declared "we believe that military intervention would be the worst solution."103 Meanwhile anti-war groups across the world organised public protests. According to French academic Dominique Reynié between January 3 and April 12, 2003, 36 million people across the globe took part in almost 3,000 protests against war in Iraq, the demonstrations on February 15, 2003 being the largest and most prolific.104 In February 2003, the U.S. Army's top general, Eric Shinseki, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that it would take "several hundred thousand soldiers" to secure Iraq.105 Two days later, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said the post-war troop commitment would be less than the number of troops required to win the war and, "the idea that it would take several hundred thousand U.S. forces is far from the mark." Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said Shineski's estimate was "way off the mark," because other countries would take part in an occupying force.106 In March 2003, Hans Blix reported that, "No evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found," in Iraq, saying that progress was made in inspections which would continue.40 But the U.S. government announced that "diplomacy has failed" and that it would proceed with a coalition of allied countries, named the "coalition of the willing", to rid Iraq of its alleged weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. government abruptly advised U.N. weapons inspectors to immediately pull out of Baghdad. There were also serious legal questions surrounding the launching of the war against Iraq and the Bush Doctrine of preemptive war. On September 16, 2004 Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, said of the invasion, "I have indicated it was not in conformity with the U.N. charter. From our point of view, from the charter point of view, it was illegal."107 In November 2008 Lord Bingham, the former UK Law Lord, described the war a serious violation of international law, and accused Britain and the US of acting like a "world vigilante". He also criticized the post-invasion record of Britain as "an occupying power in Iraq". Regarding the treatment of Iraqi detainees in Abu Ghraib, Bingham said: "Particularly disturbing to proponents of the rule of law is the cynical lack of concern for international legality among some top officials in the Bush administration."108 2003: InvasionThe first CIA team entered Iraq on July 10, 2002.109 This team was composed of members of the CIA's famed Special Activities Division and was later joined by members of the U.S. Military's elite Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).110 Together, they prepared for the invasion of conventional U.S. Military forces. These efforts consisted of getting several Iraqi Divisions to surrender rather than oppose the invasion and to identify all of the initial leadership targets during very high risk reconaissance missions.110 Most importantly, their efforts organized the Kurdish Peshmerga to become the northern front of the invasion. Together this force defeated Ansar al-Islam in Northern Iraq prior to the invasion and than defeated Saddam's forces in the north.110111 The battle against Ansar al-Islam led to the death of a substantial number of terrorists and the uncovering of a chemical weapons facility at Sargat. These terrorists would have been in the subsequent insurgency had they not been eliminated. This battle may have been the Tora Bora of Iraq in some ways, but it was a defeat for Ansar al-Islam and their ally Al Qaeda.112109 At 5:34 AM Baghdad time on March 20, 2003 (9:34 p.m., March 19 EST) the military invasion of Iraq began.113 The 2003 invasion of Iraq, led by U.S. Army General Tommy Franks, began under the codename "Operation Iraqi liberation",114 later renamed "Operation Iraqi Freedom", the UK codename Operation Telic, and the Australian codename Operation Falconer. Coalition forces also cooperated with Kurdish Peshmerga forces in the north. Approximately forty other nations, the "coalition of the willing," participated by providing troops, equipment, services, security, and special forces. The military objectives of the invasion were; end the Hussein regime; eliminate weapons of mass destruction; eliminate Islamic terrorists; obtain intelligence on terrorist networks; distribute humanitarian aid; secure Iraq’s oil infrastructure; and assist in creating a representative government as a model for other Middle East nations.113 The invasion was a quick and decisive operation encountering major resistance, though not what the American, British and other forces expected. The Iraqi regime had prepared to fight both a conventional and irregular war at the same time, conceding territory when faced with superior conventional forces, largely armored, but launching smaller scale attacks in the rear using fighters dressed in civilian and para-military clothes. This achieved some temporary successes and created unexpected challenges for the invading forces, especially the Americans. In the north, OIF-1 used the largest special operations force since the successful attack on the Taliban in Afghanistan just over a year earlier. The Iraqi Army was quickly overwhelmed in each engagement it faced with the Americans, with the elite Fedayeen Saddam putting up strong, sometimes suicidal, resistance before melting away into the civilian population. On April 9 Baghdad fell, ending Saddam's 24-year rule. U.S. forces seized the deserted Baath Party ministries and helped tear down a huge iron statue of Saddam, photos and video of which became symbolic of the event, although later controversial. In November 2008, Iraqis staged a similar tearing down and burning of a statue of George Bush.115 The abrupt fall of Baghdad was accompanied by a widespread outpouring of gratitude toward the Americans, British and their allies, but also massive civil disorder, including the looting of government buildings and drastically increased crime to due an absence of law and order.116117 According to The Pentagon, 250,000 short tons (230,000 t) (of 650,000 short tons (590,000 t) total) of ordnance was looted, providing a significant source of ammunition for the Iraqi insurgency. The invasion phase concluded when Tikrit, Saddam's home town, fell with little resistance to the Marines of Task Force Tripoli and on April 15 the coalition declared the invasion effectively over. In the invasion phase of the war (March 19-April 30), 9,200 Iraqi combatants were killed along with 7,299 civilians, primarily by U.S. air and ground forces.118 Coalition forces reported the death in combat of 139 U.S. military personnel119 and 33 UK military personnel.120 Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraq Survey Group
Shortly after the invasion, the multinational coalition created the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) سلطة الائتلاف الموحدة, based in the Green Zone, as a transitional government of Iraq until the establishment of a democratic government. Citing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 (May 22, 2003) and the laws of war, the CPA vested itself with executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the Iraqi government from the period of the CPA's inception on April 21, 2003, until its dissolution on June 28, 2004. The CPA was originally headed by Jay Garner, a former U.S. military officer, but his appointment lasted only until May 11, 2003 when President Bush appointed L. Paul Bremer. He served until the CPA's dissolution in July 2004. Another group created by the multinational force in Iraq post-invasion was the 1,400-member international Iraq Survey Group who conducted a fact-finding mission to find Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes. In 2004 the ISG's Duelfer Report121 stated that Iraq did not have a viable WMD program. Post-invasion phase
The USS Abraham Lincoln returning to port carrying its Mission Accomplished banner
On May 1, 2003, President Bush staged a dramatic visit to the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln operating a few miles west of San Diego, California. The visit climaxed at sunset with Bush's now well-known "Mission Accomplished" speech. In this nationally televised speech, delivered before the sailors and airmen on the flight deck, Bush effectively declared victory due to the defeat of Iraq's conventional forces. However, Saddam Hussein remained at large and significant pockets of resistance remained. After President Bush's speech, coalition forces noticed a gradually increasing flurry of attacks on its troops in various regions, especially in the "Sunni Triangle".122 The initial Iraqi insurgents were supplied by hundreds of weapons caches created prior to the invasion by the conventional Iraqi army and Republican Guard.
May 18, 2004: Staff Sgt. Kevin Jessen checks the underside of two anti-tank mines found in a village outside Ad Dujayl, Iraq in the Sunni Triangle.
Initially, Iraqi resistance (known to the coalition as "Anti-Iraqi Forces") largely stemmed from fedayeen and Saddam/Baath Party loyalists, but soon religious radicals and Iraqis angered by the occupation contributed to the insurgency. The three provinces with the highest number of attacks were Baghdad, Al Anbar, and Salah Ad Din. Those three provinces account for 35% of the population, but are responsible for 73% of U.S. military deaths (as of December 5, 2006), and an even higher percentage of recent U.S. military deaths (about 80%.)123 Insurgents use guerrilla tactics including; mortars, missiles, suicide attacks, snipers, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs, small arms fire (usually with assault rifles), and RPGs (rocket propelled grenades), as well as sabotage against the oil, water, and electrical infrastructure. Post-invasion Iraq coalition efforts commenced after the fall of the Hussein regime. The coalition nations, together with the United Nations, began to work to establish a stable democratic state capable of defending itself, as well as overcoming internal divisions.124125 Meanwhile, coalition military forces launched several operations around the Tigris River peninsula and in the Sunni Triangle. A series of similar operations were launched throughout the summer in the Sunni Triangle. Toward the end of 2003, the intensity and pace of insurgent attacks began to increase. A sharp surge in guerrilla attacks ushered in an insurgent effort that was termed the "Ramadan Offensive", as it coincided with the beginning of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. To counter this offensive, coalition forces begin to use air power and artillery again for the first time since the end of the invasion by striking suspected ambush sites and mortar launching positions. Surveillance of major routes, patrols, and raids on suspected insurgents were stepped up. In addition, two villages, including Saddam’s birthplace of al-Auja and the small town of Abu Hishma were wrapped in barbed wire and carefully monitored. However, the failure to restore basic services to pre-war levels, where over a decade of sanctions, bombing, corruption, and decaying infrastructure had left major cities barely functioning, contributed to local anger at the IPA government headed by an executive council. Hunting down the Hussein regime
In the summer of 2003, the multinational forces focused on hunting down the remaining leaders of the former regime. On July 22, a raid by the U.S. 101st Airborne Division and soldiers from Task Force 20 killed Saddam Hussein's sons (Uday and Qusay) along with one of his grandsons. In all, over 300 top leaders of the former regime were killed or captured, as well as numerous lesser functionaries and military personnel. Most significantly, Saddam Hussein himself was captured on December 13, 2003 on a farm near Tikrit in Operation Red Dawn.126 The operation was conducted by the United States Army's 4th Infantry Division and members of Task Force 121. Intelligence on Saddam’s whereabouts came from his family members and former bodyguards.127 With the capture of Saddam and a drop in the number of insurgent attacks, some concluded the multinational forces were prevailing in the fight against the insurgency. The provisional government began training the New Iraqi Security forces intended to defend the country, and the United States promised over $20 billion in reconstruction money in the form of credit against Iraq's future oil revenues. Oil revenue was also used for rebuilding schools and for work on the electrical and refining infrastructure. Shortly after the capture of Saddam, elements left out of the Coalition Provisional Authority began to agitate for elections and the formation of an Iraqi Interim Government. Most prominent among these was the Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The Coalition Provisional Authority opposed allowing democratic elections at this time, preferring instead to eventually hand-over power to the Interim Iraqi Government.128 Due to the internal fight for power in the new Iraqi government more insurgents stepped up their activities. The two most turbulent centers were the area around Fallujah and the poor Shia sections of cities from Baghdad (Sadr City) to Basra in the south. 2004: The insurgency expands
The start of 2004 was marked by a relative lull in violence. Insurgent forces reorganised during this time, studying the multinational forces' tactics and planning a renewed offensive. However, violence did increase during the Iraq Spring Fighting of 2004 with foreign fighters | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||